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The Graduated Response: Digital Guillotine or
a Reasonable Plan for Combating Online Piracy?
by Danielle Serbin1
“With a [peer-to-peer file sharing] system, you
can share your favorite songs with your best friend – or
your 20,000 best friends.”2
1

Online file sharing is great for users. It gives
them free and easy access to millions of songs and
movies with the click of a button. But file sharing is
arguably harmful to the recording and film industries
(“the industry”), precisely because it allows users to
receive copyrighted works for free. In fact, the industry
blames peer-to-peer file sharing for billions of dollars
in lost revenue.3 The industry has attempted to target
online file-sharing with many different tactics, most
prominently a mass-litigation campaign against endusers.4 That campaign, largely considered a failure,
ended in 2008.5 In July 2011, the industry announced
a new plan for targeting illegal file-sharing.6 The plan is
similar to a “three strikes and you’re out” model used in
many countries,7 whereby users engaging in illegal filesharing are given a warning for the first two instances
of illegally sharing files, and on the third instance
their Internet service is temporarily cut off.8 The July
graduated response deal is more of a “six strikes and
you’re maybe out” system.9 The industry, in partnership
1. Third year law student, University of California Berkeley
School of Law, Boalt Hall.
2. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses
Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity
54 (2004), http://www.jus.uio.no/sisu/free_culture.lawrence_lessig/
portrait.letter.pdf.
3. See Part I, infra.
4. See Part III, infra.
5. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon
Mass Suits, Wall Street J. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB122966038836021137.html?mod=rss_whats_news_
technology.
6. Cornne McSherry & Eric Goldman, The “Graduated
Response” Deal: What if Users Had Been At the Table?, Electronic
Frontier Foundation (July 18, 2011), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2011/07/graduated-response-deal-what-if-users-had-been.
7. Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?,
13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 695, 727 (2011) [hereinafter Bridy I]
(e.g. the U.K., France, South Korea, and Taiwan).
8. See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 Fla. L. Rev.
1374 (2010).
9. Memorandum of Understanding, Center for Copyright
Information 24 (July 6, 2011), http://www.copyrightinformation.
org/sites/default/files/Momorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf.
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with the major Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
developed a program of six warnings of increasing
intensity. For the first few instances of infringement,
users will receive educational pamphlets, informing
them that file-sharing is illegal and that there are legal
routes to obtain movies and music online.10 But for
users who continue to file-share, the ISP will slow down
or even cut off Internet access.11 While some laud the
program as an important step towards reducing online
copyright infringement,12 others refer to such a system
as a “digital guillotine,” because it “[kills] a critical way
people connect with the world.”13
This paper examines the July 2011 graduated
response deal and concludes that it is not an optimal
approach for addressing peer-to-peer file sharing–not
for the industry, and not for the users. Part I briefly
explains the technology of peer-to-peer file sharing
technology and the reasons the industry wants to
eliminate it (or more realistically, reduce it). Part II
explains the industry’s tactics for combating file sharing
before the graduated response. It explains why the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) – the
provision of copyright law meant to address illegal
Internet downloading – has not been a useful resource
for preventing file sharing. Part III explains how
because of DMCA’s failure, the industry has had to use
other means to target file sharing, most prominently
a mass-litigation campaign against peer-to-peer file
sharers, which proved to be both ineffective and hugely
unpopular.
Part IV explains the July graduated response
deal, and examines both the benefits and problems
the program will create for users and the industry. It
explains how it poses significant concerns for users
because the graduated response allows ISPs to slow or
cut off Internet access. Part IV argues that the problem
with the graduated response is that the “punishment”
10. Id. at 8-9.
11. Id. at 10-13.
12. Nate Anderson, White House: We “Win the Future” by
Making ISPs into Copyright Cops, Ars Technica (July 7, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/07/white-house-wewin-the-future-by-making-isps-into-copyright-enforcers.ars.
13. William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright
Wars 14 (2004).
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doesn’t match the “crime” – it slows or cuts off all of a
user’s Internet access not because the user fails to pay
his or her bill, but because some of the user’s activity
allegedly infringes. And the graduated response system
does all of this without providing the procedural
safeguards an Internet user would otherwise receive in
court. Further, Part IV explains the significant problems
associated with slowed or terminated Internet access,
chief among them impeding upon a user’s freedom of
expression and political assembly – two activities for
which the Internet is a major forum.
Finally, Part V offers a potential alternative
to the July graduated response deal. It advocates for
a program that would have ISPs charge users a “filesharing fee” for each instance of illegal file sharing,
and then pass the proceeds onto the copyright holders.
This approach is superior for the industry because it
provides a quick and efficient mechanism for reducing
losses incurred from peer-to-peer file sharing. And it is
superior to the July graduated response deal for users
because it does not cut slow or off Internet access.
I.

Peer-to-Peer Sharing: What it is and Why the
Industry Wants to Stop It
A. Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Defined

Peer-to-peer file sharing differs from music
and movie downloading performed on a traditional
client-server system. A client-server system is a “one
way road,” where users open a website and download
a file directly from the website to their computers.14
Peer-to-peer sharing is a two-way street; while you’re
online downloading other people’s files, others using
the sharing software can download files you have stored
on your hardware.15
Peer-to-peer file sharing utilizes a software
program to locate other computers that have files a user
wants. File sharing occurs when: (1) the user logs in to
a peer-to-peer file sharing software (such as Gnutella,
BitTorrent, or The Pirate Bay); (2) the user requests files
for download; (3) the software queries other computers
that are connected to the Internet and also running the
file-sharing software; (4) the program finds a computer
with the requested file and downloads it directly to
14. Carmen Carmack, How BitTorrent Works,
HowStuffWorks (Mar. 25, 2006), http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/bittorrent.htm; For a comprehensive the history
of peer-to-peer file sharing, see Andrew W. Eichner, File Sharing:
A Tool for Innovation, or a Criminal Instrument?, 2011 BCIPTF 1
(2011), available at http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
Andrew_Eichner_Note_File_Sharing_EICedits-final-edit.pdf.
15. Id.

the user’s hard drive.16 This way, users are able to share
songs and movies over the Internet with each other free
of charge, without ever storing the material online or
downloading it from a website.
B. The Problem with Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing
Peer-to-peer file sharing violates copyright
law because it infringes upon the copyright holder’s
exclusive rights of distribution and reproduction.17
Many scholars argue that the current copyright
framework is antiquated because it does not account
for how easy modern technology makes reproduction
and distribution (and hence infringement).18 However,
the law is clear that peer-to-peer file sharing is illegal,
and Congress doesn’t appear ready to change this.
But simply because peer-to-peer file sharing is illegal
does not mean it is necessarily harmful to copyright
holders.
This paper works on the assumption that
peer-to-peer file sharing is problematic and requires a
solution. Not everyone agrees with this proposition.
Some studies conclude that illegal file sharing does not
negatively impact industry sales; some even argue that
file sharing allows for greater “sampling” of recordings,
which ultimately leads to greater sales.19 However,
there are many studies that conclude otherwise.20
What is relevant for this Article is that both the movie
and recording industries believe that peer-to-peer
file sharing hurts sales and is worth combating. For
example, in 2008, Michael Robinson of the MPAA
16. Id.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3) (2006); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). Notably, some
scholars argue that when users simply make copyrighted works
available by placing them in a shared folder on their computer,
this does not necessarily constitute an illegal “distribution” under
the Copyright statute, and courts misinterpret the law when they
conclude that it does. See, e.g., Andrew James McGarrow, The
“Making Available” Theory and the Future of P2P Networks: Does
Merely Making Files Available for Further Distribution Constitute
Copyright Infringement, and is it Time for Congress to Act in
Accordance with this Technology?, 88 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 155,
161 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:
Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev., 813, 851 (2001).
19. John Schwartz, A Heretical View of File Sharing, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 5, 2004, at C1.
20. See, e.g., Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Impact of
File Sharing on the Movie Industry: An Empirical Analysis Using a
Panel of Countries, 4 (Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1792615 (arguing that statistical evidence supports the
conclusion that BitTorrent technology negatively impacts movie
video sales).
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(Motion Picture Association of America) stated that
the movie industry loses “over $18 billion annually
worldwide to piracy and Internet piracy . . . [i]t is
a growing problem and a growing threat.”21 And
according to the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), as of August 2008, “global theft of
sound recordings cost the U.S. economy $12.5 billion
in lost revenue and more than 71,000 jobs and $2
billion in wages to U.S. workers.”22
II. Pre-Graduated Response Legal Framework:
The DMCA Fails as an Efficient Mechanism
for Combating Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Most online downloading of copyrighted
movies and music occurs not on traditional clientserver websites, but through peer-to-peer file-sharing.23
However, the DMCA, which is the legal mechanism
for combating Internet copyright infringement, did not
anticipate peer-to-peer file sharing. This is primarily
because such file sharing did not exist in 1998 when
Congress drafted the DMCA.24 As such, Congress
structured the DMCA to prevent Internet piracy
through client-server illegal downloading.25
The DMCA provides safe harbor provisions
to ISPs so long as they conform to certain statutory
requirements.26 These statutory requirements are meant
to facilitate collaboration between ISPs and copyright
holders so that infringing material can be removed
from the Internet without a court order.27 However,
because Congress passed the DMCA before the advent
of peer-to-peer file sharing, the DMCA is only effective
at achieving this collaboration for illegal activity
performed on client-server sites.28
The DMCA distinguishes between “storage
providers,” the traditional client-server sites (which
served as host to most of the infringing activity when
the DMCA was passed), and “conduit providers,”
21. Movie Industry Attacks Internet Downloading, WCVBTV
Boston (May 16, 2008), http://www.thebostonchannel.
com/r/16274816/detail.html.
22. David Kravets, MPAA Waffling on Piracy Costs; RIAA Says
Illicit CDs Worth $13.74 Each, Wired (Aug. 19, 2008), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/mpaa-waffling-o/ [hereinafter
MPAA Waffling].
23. See, e.g., McGarrow, supra note 17, at 180.
24. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to
Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 Or. L. Rev.
81, 97 (2010) [hereinafter Bridy II]. Napster, the first popular filesharing system, launched in July 1999. See Lessig, supra note 2.
25. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 97.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2006).
27. Bridy I, supra note 7, at 713.
28. Id. at 719.
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which provide access to the peer-to-peer file sharers of
today.29 Storage providers are governed by DMCA §
512(c). They must comply with the DMCA’s noticeand-takedown provisions.30 This system works relatively
simply: a copyright holder notices infringing material
on a server, the copyright holder notifies the manager
of server about the infringing material, and then the
manager removes the material.31 Further, under the “red
flag” provision of the DMCA, even if a storage provider
does not receive a notice of infringing material from
a copyright holder, if it has knowledge of infringing
material on its network, it must remove the material.32
Thus, the DMCA is structured so that storage providers
must work with the industry in order to maintain their
safe harbor status.33
Unlike with storage providers, the DMCA
provides “almost [an] absolute immunity from
liability for transitory network communications . .
. .”34 The rationale for this is that, at least when the
DMCA was created, conduit providers had no way
of knowing whether infringing activity occurred
over their systems. Conduit providers “route and
transmit information without modifying it or storing
it more than fleetingly.”35 Conduit providers fall
under § 512(a) of the DMCA, and are not subject to
the notice-and-take-down provisions of § 512(c).36
Rather, to maintain their safe harbor status, conduit
providers need only (1) adopt a policy that provides
for the termination of access for repeat infringers in
appropriate circumstances; (2) implement that policy
in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform its subscribers
of the policy.37 Yet a conduit provider need not monitor
29. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 97.
30. § 512(c)(1)(A).
31. See id.
32. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). The law is still evolving regarding what
constitutes a “red flag.” See, e.g., Viacom Int’l v. YouTube Inc., 253
F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
33. Or else face suit for copyright infringement on multiple
potential theories. For example, Viacom sued Google for direct
copyright infringement, inducement to infringe, and contributory
infringement. See id.
34. David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liability for
Contributory Copyright Infringement, B.C. Intell. Prop. & Tech.
F.110701 (2006).
35. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 89.
36. See § 512(a); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d
771, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he safe harbor provision [in §
512(a)], which limits the liability of an ISP when it merely acts
as a conduit for infringing material without storing, caching, or
providing links to copyrighted material[, does] not . . . contain the
remove-or-disable-access provision. . . .”).
37. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 90 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)
(1)(A)); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
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its service or “affirmatively [seek] facts indicating
infringing activity.”38 Therefore, even though a conduit
provider must have an anti-infringement policy in
place to maintain safe harbor status, the DMCA is not
structured to promote collaboration between conduit
ISPs and the industry in the same way it promotes
collaboration between storage providers and copyright
holders.
With the advent of peer-to-peer file sharing
in the early 2000s, the industry faced a problem.
Most infringing activity began occurring not on
traditional client-server websites, but through peer-topeer downloads.39 But the industry had no means for
addressing the problem in a quick, efficient manner,
like it does when someone uploaded an infringing
movie to YouTube.40
III. Before the Graduated Response: the Failed
“War on Piracy”
In 2003, the RIAA began a campaign against
online music theft – some referred to as a “war on
piracy”41 while others considered it a “anti-consumer
crusade.”42 The MPAA began a similar campaign in
2005.43 Notably, while the two organizations launched
similar anti-piracy campaigns,44 the RIAA’s lawsuits
against end-users were both more numerous and
more widely publicized.45 Both the RIAA and the
MPAA used many tactics to combat peer-to-peer file
sharing: developing an education campaign,46 offering
copyrighted works for download through legal means

38. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1).
39. See, e.g., McGarrow, supra note 17, at 180.
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
41. McBride & Smith, supra note 5.
42. How To Not Get Sued for File Sharing, Elec. Frontier
Found. (Jul. 1, 2006), https://www.eff.org/wp/how-not-get-suedfile-sharing.
43. Bary Alyssa Johnson, MPAA Anti-Piracy Lawsuits
Target Individuals, PC Magazine (Aug. 29, 2005, 04:32
PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1853573,00.
asp#fbid=kCTuxJnUIgJ.
44. For example, they were both plaintiffs in MGM v.
Grokster, 543 U.S. 913 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Brett Caraway, MPAA Talks to Copygrounds About
P2P File Sharing and Copyright, Copygrounds (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://copygrounds.com/2010/10/05/mpaa-talks-to-copygroundsabout-p2p-file-sharing-and-copyright/ (stating that Fritz Attaway,
Executive Vice President and Special Policy Advisor for the MPAA,
said the MPAA does target end-users, but due to the nature of the
respective copyrighted material, the MPAA has filed fewer suits
against end-users than the RIAA).
46. Daniel Reynolds, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing
and Alternatives More Compatible with Public Morality, 9 Minn. J.L.
Sci. & Tech., 977, 978 (2008); see also Caraway, supra note 45.

(through licenses with providers like iTunes),47 and
targeting websites that facilitated peer-to-peer file
sharing such as Napster and Grokster.48
Part of the anti-piracy campaign involved suing
end-users for peer-to-peer file sharing.49 The RIAA sued
an estimated 26,000 users through the campaign.50
Almost all lawsuits resulted in the end-users settling
with the industry, typically for $3,000 - $5,000,51 or
paying the statutory fine of (typically) $750 per song52
as part of a default judgment.53 However, in several
high-profile lawsuits, the RIAA received huge jury
verdicts against individual end-users. These included
a $675,000 verdict against a 25-year-old graduate
student for illegally downloading 30 songs54 and a $1.5
million verdict against a Minnesota woman for illegally
downloading 24 songs.55
The war was widely unpopular due to harsh
penalties, what some called “strong arm” enforcement
policies, and misidentified or ill-targeted end-users.56
Among the targets of RIAA’s suits were “several single
mothers, a dead person[,] a 13-year-old girl[,]”57 and a
47. See Caraway, supra note 45; Kelly Leong, iTunes: Have
They Created a System for International Copyright Enforcement?, 13
New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 365, 384 (2007) (stating that Apple
obtained “licensing agreements from five major record labels—EMI,
Sony, BMG, Vivendi-Universal and AOL/Time-Warner—and
licensing agreements with independent record labels”).
48. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001); M.G.M. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
49. See Reynolds, supra note 46, at 981.
50. Id.
51. See Jonathan Salzman, Trial to Begin in Music Copyright
Case, Boston.com (Jul. 28, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/
local/massachusetts/articles/2009/07/28/four_record_labels_suing_
bu_student/; Yu, supra note 8, at 1390 (explaining what defendants
face with, what Lawrence Lessig refers to, a “‘mafia-like choice”
between a costly settlement and an outrageously high legal bill
incurred in defending the lawsuit”).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2) (2006) (statutorily, damages
can range from $200 - $150,000 per infringement, depending on
the willfulness of the infringement and at the court’s discretion).
53. See Reynolds, supra note 46, at 980-984 (explaining in
detail the life-cycle of a RIAA suit against an end-user); see also Ray
Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, Ray Beckerman
PC (Apr. 9, 2008), http://beckermanlegal.com/howriaa.htm.
54. Denise Lavoie, Joel Tenebaum: Jury Awards $675,000 in
Boston Music Downloading Case, Huffington Post (Jul. 31, 2009,
08:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/31/joeltenenbaum-jury-award_n_249155.html.
55. See David Kravets, Judge Slashes ‘Appalling’ $1.5 Million
File Sharing Verdict to $54,000, Wired (July 22, 2011, 2:29 PM),
http://m.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/kazaa-verdict-slashed.
56. See Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers,
And Other Good Targets For The Recording Industry’s File Sharing
Litigation, 4 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 133, 133 (2006); see also
McBride & Smith, supra note 5 (referring to the suits against endusers as a “public relations nightmare”).
57. See Sag, supra note 57, at 146; Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues
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family without a computer.58 One target of an MPAA
suit was a 67-year old Wisconsin grandfather whose
grandson illegally downloaded four movies.59
To properly assess the results of the industry’s
mass-litigation campaign, two questions must be
examined. First, did the campaign decrease illegal filesharing of copyrighted material? And second, did the
campaign correspond to a decrease in losses suffered by
the industry? There is inconsistent evidence regarding
the first question.60 But, while studies yield differing
results when it comes to whether internet downloading
decreased after the industry’s mass-lawsuit campaign,
there is widespread agreement that the industry’s antipiracy campaign did very little, if anything, to stop the
downward trend in sales.61 The “RIAA [sic] reported
declining revenue in nine [out of ten years between
2000-2010], with album sales falling an average of 8%
each year.”62 No doubt, other factors contributed to
this decline,63 but the RIAA clearly attributes much
of it to online piracy. In 2008, the year the RIAA
ended its mass-litigation campaign,64 the RIAA stated
that “global theft of sound recordings cost the U.S.
economy $12.5 billion in lost revenue and more than
71,000 jobs and $2 billion in wages to U.S. workers.”65
The film industry did not experience a similar overall
decline in sales (not consistently over the years and
among its various markets (i.e., home video, box
office)),66 but in 2008 an MPAA report stated that
Computer-Less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ars technica
(Apr. 24, 2006), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/04/6662.
ars.
58. Id.
59. Nate Mook, MPAA Offers Deal to Sued Grandfather,
betanews (Nov. 4, 2005), http://betanews.com/2005/11/04/mpaaoffers-deal-to-sued-grandfather/.
60. See Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers
and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 725, 736-745 (2005) (summarizing
empirical studies reaching both a positive and negative result); see
also RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Elect. Frontier Found.,
9 (2008), http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.
61. Interestingly, if the studies arguing that illegal Internet
downloading decreased due to the mass-litigation campaign are
correct, this might mean that (as some argue) illegal downloads of
copyrighted materials have little effect on music and movie sales.
62. See David Goldman, Music Industry’s Lost Decade:
Sales Cut in Half, CNN.com (Feb. 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.
com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/.
63. See id. (stating that “the two recessions during the decade
certainly didn’t help music sales. It’s also a bit unfair to compare
the 2000s with the 1990s, since the ‘90s enjoyed an unnatural
sales boost when consumers replaced their cassette tapes and vinyl
records en masse with CDs”).
64. See McBride & Smith, supra note 5.
65. See MPAA Waffling, supra note 22.
66. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, DVD sales tank in 2009 as
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Internet piracy cost the film industry $7 billion.67
Further, in 2010 the MPAA stated that online piracy
costs the creative industries “billions of dollars” and
threatens the job security of “hundreds of thousands” of
Americans.68
Therefore, the industry’s mass-litigation
campaign was not effective in deterring peer-to-peer
file sharing. Years after the campaign began, both music
and movie industry representatives continued to claim
that piracy is wide-spread and costs them billions of
dollars in lost revenue.
In fact, there is evidence that the masslitigation campaign added to the net losses suffered by
the industry:
[T]he lawsuits did not increase the
payments to artists by even one penny.
Overall, in terms of revenues these
lawsuits had little, if any, effect. The
majority of [the lawsuits] were settled
for amounts ranging from $3,000 to
$11,000, while the cost of pursuing
these lawsuits has often exceeded these
sums.69
Another study concluded that RIAA recovered only 2%
of the money it spent on lawsuits through settlements
and verdicts against end-users.70
IV. The July 2011 Graduated Response Deal
A. Why the Deal?
When it publicly announced an end to its
mass-litigation campaign, the RIAA also announced its
interest in working with ISPs to implement a graduated
response system.71 But the ISPs initially denied interest
in the program.72 In fact, as recently as March 2010,
Americans Head to the Cinema, ars technica (Jan. 4, 2010), http://
arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/01/dvd-sales-tank-in-2009-asamericans-head-to-the-cinema.ars.
67. See MPAA Waffling, supra note 22.
68. See Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Reply Comments at 5-6,
In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices,
24 F.C.C.R. 13064 (2009), available at http://www.mpaa.org/
Resources/46ba617a-4dc9-4fdb-acce-9100ac274af4.pdf.
69. Lital Helman, When Your Recording Agency Turns into an
Agency Problem: The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA
49, 65 (2009).
70. See Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $17.6 Million
In Lawsuits... To Get $391,000 In Settlements?, Techdirt
(Jul. 14, 2010, 09:44 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100713/17400810200.shtml.
71. See McBride & Smith, supra note 5.
72. See David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA
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a Verizon representative publicly disavowed ISP
involvement in a graduate response: “the government
and the courts, not ISPs, are responsible for intellectual
property enforcement, and only they can secure
and balance the various property, privacy, and due
process rights that are at play and often in conflict in
this realm[.]”73 However, other ISPs appeared more
interested in a graduated response system. For example,
in 2009, AT&T publicly admitted to taking part in a
“trial” graduated response system.74 And in July 2011,
all of the major ISPs (including Verizon) formally
agreed to the graduated response deal with the MPAA
and the RIAA.75 No consumer groups took part in
negotiating the graduated response.76
It is not clear why the ISPs changed their tune
and agreed to collaborate with the industry on the
graduated response. None of the ISPs have provided
much of a public explanation about the shift in policy.
Below is a of list various theories to explain this shift in
policy – the reality is likely a combination of them all.
1. The Government Made Them Do It
Notably, though the ISPs are passive carriers
under the DMCA and have significant safe harbor
protection, nothing prevents Congress from amending
the DMCA to alter this protection. So it is in the ISP’s
best interest to cooperate with government pressure.
Recently released e-mails between the U.S. Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator, Victoria Espinel,
and the industry and ISP leaders reveal that the
government was very involved and brought the parties
to the table, encouraged the deal, and was kept in the
loop regarding the terms of the deal.77
3-Strikes Plan, Wired (Jan. 5, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o/.
73. See Bridy I, supra note 7, at 730 (citing Letter from James
W. Cicconi, AT&T executive, to Victoria Espinel (March 24,
2010)).
74. See Sarah McBride, Relationship Status of RIAA and ISPs:
It’s Complicated, Wall St. J. Digits Blog (Mar. 26, 2009), http://
blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/03/26/relationship-status-of-riaa-andisps-its-complicated/.
75. Antony Bruno, Labels Reach Deal With ISPs on Antipiracy
Effort, Billboard (July 7, 2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/
industry/legal-and-management/labels-reach-deal-with-isps-onantipiracy-1005267702.story.
76. See McSherry, supra note 6.
77. See David Kravets, U.S. Copyright Czar Cozied Up to
Content Industry, E-Mails Show, Wired (Oct. 14, 2011, 06:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/copyright-czar-coziesup/#more-31071; see also Anderson, supra note 12 (stating “while
ISPs were for years seen more like the ‘common carriers’ of yore,
who ran a network and were generally not responsible for policing
the uses of that network, government sentiment in key quarters is
changing”).

2. ISPs have a Closer Relationship with the
Industry than in the Past
“Eight years ago, the Recording Industry
Association of America had to sue Verizon to try to
uncover the identity of a customer who was sharing
music online,” but now the industry enjoys a much
more collaborative relationship with ISPs.78 For
example, Comcast owns a majority stake in NBC
Universal, and studios license movies to cable providers
as part of video on-demand service. “The [ISPs] want
to cooperate with Hollywood because the carriers
recognize that their own growth depends in part on
bundled content strategies . . . [t]hey don’t want to be
just utilities providing Internet access, but premium
content distributors as well.”79
3. No Longer “Dumb Pipes”
As mentioned in Part II, ISPs have traditionally
been considered passive carriers and therefore enjoy the
strongest safe-harbor protections in the DMCA. But
this may be changing because of (a) the ISPs recent
implementation of website-filtering technology and (b)
a recent district court decision holding that a passive
carrier who engages in filtering is not eligible for §
512(a) safe harbor status.
Many ISPs now implement “Deep Packet
Inspection” (DPI) technology, which allows them to
examine a user’s Internet activity in great detail and to
block access to certain websites.80 ISPs are interested in
DPI technology for many potential reasons unrelated
to copyright infringement: “DPI can be used . . .
for detection and filtering of viruses and malware,
management of network congestion,” “traffic sorting,”
“data mining,” and for “law enforcement purposes, as
required by the Communications Assistance to Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), to capture and transmit
data to government agents.”81
In Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.82
the court held that Usenet.com, a website that acted
78. Ben Sisario, To Slow Piracy, Internet Providers Ready
Penalties, N.Y. Times, Jul. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/08/technology/to-slow-piracy-internet-providersready-penalties.html?pagewanted=all.
79. See Nate Anderson, Judge Throws Book at Usenet.com in
RIAA Lawsuit, Ars Technica (July 1, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://
newsystocks.com/News/4099511/Pirates-of-the-Web-in-Trouble.
80. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its
Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power
Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 633, 656 (2008); see also Bridy
II, supra note 24, at 104.
81. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 104.
82. 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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as a “‘common carrier’ delivering requested files to
subscribers without active involvement”83, was not
eligible for the DMCA § 512(a) safe harbor provision.84
Though superficially Usenet.com appeared to be a
passive carrier (i.e., it did not store user’s uploaded
files), the court noted that Usenet “took active
measures to create servers dedicated to MP3 files and to
increase the retention times of newsgroups containing
digital music files.”85 Further, “Usenet.com also took
[many] steps to control subscriber access to material,
including automated filtering and human review to
block pornography and block access to certain users.”86
Because of the Usenet decision, some commentators
and scholars concluded that “[w]hile monitoring by
itself may not eliminate the safe harbor qualification,
deep packet monitoring probably does because
the packet header information likely will identify
significant information about the nature and type of
traffic sufficient to put the ISP on actual notice of any
copyright infringement.”87 So ISPs may have been more
willing to implement the graduated response because,
due to DPI, they no longer are immune credible claims
of direct copyright infringement. Their rationale may
have been that it is better to collaborate with the
industry than be sued by it.
4. Jumping on the “International
Bandwagon”
The “U.K., France, South Korea, and Taiwan
have already incorporated a graduated response into
their domestic copyright enforcement systems,” and
“[s]imilar legislation is making its way through the
legislative process in New Zealand . . . .”88 And in
May 2010, one of Ireland’s major ISP providers,
Eircom, instituted a graduated response policy.89 The
fact that ISPs abroad were willing to collaborate with
the industry in combating Internet piracy may have
signaled to U.S. ISPs that the graduated response is a
83. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 122.
84. Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.
85. Id. at 148.
86. Anderson, supra note 79.
87. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on
the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power Between
Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, Penn. State Univ.,
http://www.personal.psu.edu/rmf5/Net Neutrality and IPR.htm.
88. Bridy I, supra note 7, at 727. While most international
graduated response systems are government-run (unlike the July
U.S. deal), they still require ISP involvement.
89. ISP Introduces “Graduated Response” Leading to
Disconnection for Illegal Downloaders, Reporters Without
Borders (May 28, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/ireland-isp-introducesgraduated-response-28-05-2010,37583.html.
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worthwhile endeavor.
B. The Graduated Response Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”)
On July 6, 2011, the major ISPs90 signed a
“Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) with the
RIAA and the MPAA,91 implementing a graduated
response system in the U.S.. The graduated response
system as set forth in the MOU is a sort of “six strikes
and you’re maybe out” system. The most notable
features of the system are as follows:
•

Establishment of the Center for Copyright
Information (CCI) to oversee implementation of the graduated response.92 The CCI
is governed by a six member executive committee, with three members designated by
copyright owners and three members designated by the participating ISP’s.93 The CCI
also has a three member advisory board,
with one representative chosen by the copyright holders, one by the ISPs, and the last
chosen by those two members. The advisory board members are not employees of
the ISPs or industry players, but rather will
be experts from the subject matter area and
consumer interest communities.

•

A six-step “Copyright Alert” system, involving three stages:94

90. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9, at 2123. The participating ISPs include: SBC Internet Services, Inc.,
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, Pacific Bell Telephone Company, Illinois Bell Telephone
Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Inc., Michigan
Bell Telephone Company, Nevada Bell Telephone Company,
The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Wisconsin Bell, Inc., The
Southern New England Telephone Company, and BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. (the AT&T Inc. companies); Verizon
Online LLC, Verizon Online LLC – Maryland, and Verizon Online
Pennsylvania Partnership (the Verizon companies); Comcast Cable
Communications Management, LLC; CSC Holdings, LLC (solely
with respect to its cable systems operating in New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut) (the Cablevision systems); and Time Warner
Cable Inc.
91. Id. at 25. The members of said Associations listed as
participating are: Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, Paramount
Pictures Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios LLC,
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.; Recordings, Inc., Warner
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and EMI Music North
America.
92. Id. at 3-6.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 7-13. The ISPs have some discretion about when
to implement each measure. An ISP responds to the first instance
of alleged infringement with the Educational Alert. It can respond
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o

o

o

First stage – Information Alert(s): at this
stage, the ISP notifies the subscriber of
his/her infringement. The ISP sends a
notice to the alleged infringer with the
following information: (a) copyright
infringement is illegal; (b) users must
not engage in illegal infringement; (c)
there are lawful methods of obtaining
copyrighted works; (d) continuing and
subsequent receipt of alerts may result
in the ISPs taking action by the application of mitigation measures; (e) in
addition to these Mitigation Measures,
the Participating ISP may also temporarily suspend or terminate Internet
service; and (f ) information regarding how to challenge the “Copyright
Alerts” – CCI’s appeal process. The
ISP issues the Information Alert after
the first and second instances of alleged
copyright infringement.95
Second Stage - Acknowledgment Alert
(for a user’s third and fourth alleged
infringements): This alert is similar to
the educational step, but it requires the
user to acknowledge receipt of the alert
(through a click-through mechanism, a
landing page, or a pop-up page).96
Third Stage - Mitigation Measures (for
a user’s fifth and sixth alleged infringements): At the ISP’s discretion, it can
take one of the following steps: temporary reduction in uploading and/
or downloading transmission speeds;
temporary redirection to a landing
page until the user contacts his/her ISP
to discuss the Copyright Alerts; or tem-

to the second instance of alleged infringement with either the
Educational Alert or the Acknowledgment Alert, at its discretion.
The ISP responds to the third and fourth instances of copyright
infringement with the Acknowledgment Alert. Upon receiving
notice of a fifth instance of alleged infringement, the ISP can
either issue another Acknowledgment Alert or can implement the
Mitigation Measures. The Mitigation Measures are not waivable
for the sixth instance of alleged infringement, however. Further,
the system is reset after a year: whatever measures have been taken
against a user, after a year of non-infringing activity the number of
infringements is reset back to zero.
95. Id. at 8-9
96. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9, at 9-10.

porary restriction of the user’s Internet
access.97
•

Importantly, at none of the stages must the
ISP cut off Internet access, though it can.
Similarly, should the ISP cut off Internet
access, at its discretion it need not disable
a user’s IP voice service (VOIP), e-mail account, security service, health service (i.e.,
home medical monitoring), or Internet
video programming service.98

•

A system of what the MOU labels “independent review” for users with who challenge the notification on any one of six
grounds: (1) misidentification of account;
(2) unauthorized use of account; (3) the
use of the copyright work was authorized
by the copyright owner; (4) fair use; (5)
misidentification of file; or (6) copyrighted
work was published before 1923 (and is in
the public domain).99

•

Users must pay a filing fee of $35 to invoke
review, and must electronically submit their
complaint within ten business days of receiving the Copyright Alert.100

•

The “independent reviewer” will be an attorney chosen by a “panel of neutrals,” and
the review process “will, to the extent relevant, apply prevailing legal principles as
determined by the United States federal
courts.”101
1. Problems with the MOU

The parties to the MOU claim that it “seeks
to establish a consumer-focused process for identifying
and notifying” users of infringing activity, and that the
primary goal of the MOU is to “educate consumers,
deter online infringement, and direct consumers
to lawful online legitimate sources of content.”102
However, though it may be consumer-focused, the
MOU contains numerous provisions that are not
consumer-friendly.
97. Id. at 10-13.
98. Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 30.
101. Id. at 31, 33, 35.
102. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 9, at 2.
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The MOU is certainly an improvement over
the industry’s former tactic of targeting unassuming,
and sometimes ignorant, end-users with lawsuits after
what was often only minimal file sharing. The MOU’s
focus on education over punishment – at least with the
first measure – helps to inform unassuming consumers
who may simply not know that peer-to-peer file sharing
is considered copyright infringement by the industry.103
In fact, according to the RIAA, over 25% of Americans
still do not know peer-to-peer file sharing is illegal.104
But the central problem created by the MOU is that
it allows an ISP to slow or cut off users’ Internet
without ensuring them either due process or neutral
enforcement.
Notably, the MOU does not require ISPs
to cut off Internet service. But it does not stop them
from doing so. And its other “mitigation measures”
short of cutting off service – for example, slowing
service – are similarly harmful to Internet users. This is
because cutting off Internet access is not like stopping
a cable TV service if a user does not pay his monthly
bill. It denies its users access to a fundamental part of
their daily lives – the Internet – and basic civil rights
associated with the Internet like speech and assembly
– not because users fail to pay their Internet bill, but
because of allegedly illegal Internet activity.
While Internet access is not recognized as a
civil right in the US,105 the Internet has been compared
to a civil right even by the ISPs: David Cohen,
Comcast’s executive vice president, stated that “[a]ccess
to the [I]nternet is akin to a civil rights issue for the
21st century[; it is] that access that enables people in
poorer areas to equalize access to a quality education,
quality health care and vocational opportunities.”106
Further, there is a clear trend towards expanding
Internet access; for example, “in 2009 [Congress]
appropriated $4.7 billion in economic stimulus funds
103. However, the neutrality of the educational measures
is unclear. It is likely that the education will be one-sided as it is
coming from the industry; still, for consumer advocates, this is
preferable to a system that penalizes users with costly settlements,
default judgments, or jury verdicts.
104. For Students Doing Reports, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/
faq.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
105. Finland recently became the first nation to make Internet
access a legal right. First Nation Makes Broadband Access a Legal
Right, CNN.com (July 1, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-0701/tech/finland.broadband_1_broadband-access-internet-accessuniversal-service?_s=PM:TECH.
106. Christopher Mitchell, Comcast: Internet Access Is
Temporarily a Civil Right, Huffington Post (Aug. 9, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-mitchell/comcast-internetaccess-i_b_921608.html.
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to enhance the [U.S.] broadband infrastructure and
expand access to underserved populations.”107 Thus,
because Internet access is an essential component
of daily modern life, “termination of Internet access
represents a powerful and far-reaching sanction
that directly impacts” the “ability of Internet users
to consume media, their ability to work, learn,
communicate, manage finances, and participate in the
collective life of society.”108
Additionally, the Internet is inextricably linked
to numerous already-existing civil rights, chief among
them the First Amendment rights of expression and
assembly. For example, a Pew Research study concluded
that 56% of those involved in a civic or political group
used the Internet to communicate with other group
members.109 Current jurisprudence does not consider
ISPs state actors.110 Thus, while in Reno v. ACLU, the
Supreme Court held that while the government cannot
substantially restrict speech via the Internet, no law
prevents ISPs from doing so.111 So a user whose Internet
is cut off cannot sue ISPs for violating the user’s rights
to speech and assembly, even though the Internet is
many people’s primary forum for both.
Further, the MOU provides users very little
in the way of procedural protections. The MOU
raises three primary process-related concerns. First, it
deprives users of due process they would otherwise get
in a federal court. The MOU flips many traditional
principles of due process on their head. In the
graduated response system, the industry is in essence
the “plaintiff” and the users are the alleged “defendant
infringers.” The burden of proof, however, is on the
user, as is the filing fee.112 Further, the user only has
ten days to perform research to mount its defense –
hardly enough time when going up against industrybacked lawyers in an industry-created system. A second
problem with the MOU is that it restricts the universe
of potential defenses to copyright infringement to six
defined defenses, which do not cover the entire universe
107. Bridy II, supra note 24, at 125-26.
108. Id. at 126.
109. Aaron Smith, Civic Engagement Online: Politics as Usual,
Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 1, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/
pubs/1328/online-political-civic-engagement-activity.
110. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d
532 (E.D. Va. 2004); Langdon v. Google Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622
(D. Del. 2007).
111. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
112. See Bridy I, supra note 7, at 729 (noting “there is a
significant risk of abuse inherent in a system that streamlines
enforcement by dispensing with the neutral adjudication of
claims”).
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of potential copyright defenses.113
A third problem presented in the MOU is
enforcement. Though the procedural mechanisms the
MOU has in place are lacking, perhaps an even bigger
problem for users is that there is no guarantee that the
CCI will follow those procedures. As mentioned, the
government was very involved in brokering the MOU,
and if the CCI threw its procedural handbook out the
window, it is likely the government would pressure the
industry and ISPs to get back in line. However, because
the MOU is essentially a contract between two private
entities – the ISPs and the industry – compliance
simply cannot be guaranteed.
V. An Alternative to the July Graduated
Response MOU
Because the MOU threatens user’s Internet
access, threatens the rights associated with Internet
access, and provides users no promise of due process
in doing so, this Article recommends that a different
system be adopted. This Article recommends modifying
the graduated response to a system of two warnings
followed by charging the user a fee for every subsequent
file-sharing instance.
A system that imposes fines for each instance
of illegal downloading is superior to the plan outlined
in the MOU. Like in the MOU, this system would
begin with the copyright holder notifying the ISP of
infringing activity. Then, for the first two instances of
infringement, the ISP will issue the user a warning.
This warning will consist of a notification, an
educational pamphlet, and information that the user
will be charged if he continues to file-share (much
like “Information Alerts” outlined in the MOU).
After the first two instances of infringement, the ISP
will charge the user a fee for each instance of illegal
downloading. The charges will show up on the user’s
monthly bill. The ISPs and industry groups (preferably
in collaboration with consumer groups) can determine
reasonable fees; they might even agree on graduating
the fees with each infringing activity. The ISPs will then
pass on most of the proceeds from the fees (as agreed
upon with the industry) to industry groups.
This sharing-fee system is preferable to the
plan in the MOU for all parties. First, a fee-sharing
system does not slow or cut down Internet access. It is
a system where, to the extent there is a punishment for
file sharing, the punishment fits the crime. Rather than
taking away all Internet access for continued infringing
113. McSherry, supra note 5.

activity, a user would merely be charged in relation to
his activity.
Second, the sharing-fee system provides the
industry immediate financial compensation for Internet
file-sharing. As mentioned, the MOU does no more
than deter file sharing with hopes that users will change
their ways and download music legally. A fee has the
same deterrent effect, and provides the industry direct
compensation for losses associated with Internet piracy.
In fact, so long as the fine is more than the typical
cost of a song or movie download (about $1 and $15,
respectively)114, the industry could conceivably profit
from illegal downloads (or more realistically, break
even).
The sharing-fee system is also preferable for
ISPs, who will not have to impose the harsh mitigating
measures outlined in the MOU. While consumers may
balk at the fines and blame the messenger, so long as
the fees are reasonable and are explained on the bill
and in an accompanying educational pamphlet, it is
unlikely that the backlash will result in lost customers,
at least not any more lost customers than would be the
result of a policy that slows or cuts off Internet speed.
A sharing-fee system is not without flaws.
For instance, it might be conceived as quasi-punitive
because of the fees it levies on users. But despite this
flaw, an important aspect of the sharing-fee system is
that it does not deprive users of a fundamental element
of their daily lives – the Internet. Further, some of
the same process and misidentification issues that
plagued the industry’s mass litigation campaign might
still exist with this sharing-fee system. To address this,
the ISPs should adopt an appeals system that grants
the user all of the defenses to copyright infringement
the user would have in a court of law. Moreover, due
process concerns are less prevalent in a system that does
not deprive users Internet access. Another potential
problem with the sharing-fee system is that it may
hit poorer users harder than wealthy ones. No doubt,
if a user cannot pay his or her Internet bill due to
hundreds of dollars in sharing-fees, the ISPs will cut
off their service. So the end result of the sharing-fees
system could be the same as the mitigation measures
outlined in the MOU. However, slowing Internet
114. Dawn C. Chmielewski, iTunes embraces 3-tier pricing,
will remove anti-copy software, L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/07/business/fi-itunes7 (showing
that on iTunes, songs cost either 69 cents, 99 cents, or $1.29);
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for purchased movies, Apple,
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1906 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012)
(showing that on iTunes, movie prices range from $9.99 to $14.99).
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service is not part of the sharing-fee system, and cutting
off service will not be at the ISPs’ discretion, but only
if users do not pay their Internet bill. Moreover, any
appeal process under this sharing-fee system should
be structured to allow a user to appeal before the bill
is due rather than after. This process could be akin to
the process of appealing a contested credit card charge,
which results in no penalty.
A sharing-fee system is both most efficient for
the industry and most protective of user’s interests.
While the industry chose not to implement a similar
proposal posited in the mid-2000s–a voluntary
licensing scheme that would allow file-sharing in
return for a monthly fee115–it may be more receptive
to a sharing-fee system now. Unlike a licensing system,
a sharing-fee system would not require the industry
to work directly with millions of end-users, which
addresses issues of efficiency.116 And the requisite
collaboration with the ISPs is already in place thanks
to the MOU, making the sharing-fee system easy to
implement.
Importantly, a sharing-fee system where
infringers pay copyright holders for infringing activity
is much more in-line with traditional conceptions of
U.S. copyright law than is the current plan outlined
in the MOU. In the United States, copyright has
traditionally been conceptualized as an economic right,
not a moral right. The theory behind moral rights “is
that authors of copyrightable works have inalienable
rights in their works that protect their moral or
personal interests.”117 If copyright law is conceived of
as a moral right, then it makes more sense to have a
system like the MOU in place – a system that punishes
those who infringe on another’s personhood rights by
taking away some of the infringer’s personhood rights,
in the present case those rights are Internet access and
the expression and assembly rights associated with it.
But in the United States, copyright infringement is
conceptualized as infringing upon a copyright holder’s
exclusive monopoly to exploit the creator’s work for
economic gain. If copyright law is conceptualized in
this way, it makes more sense to charge the infringer a
sum of money for infringement and place these funds

back in the copyright holder’s hands.
VI. Conclusion
Though a worthy attempt to target Internet
piracy of films and music, the 2011 Graduated
Response system ultimately levies severe penalties
upon end-users for illegal downloads. These penalties
include slowing and potential cut-off of Internet
access. Moreover, the MOU does not ensure sufficient
procedural protections for users. Instead, a sharingfee system that charges users in proportion to their
infringing downloads would place less of a burden
on users and result in greater efficiency and financial
recovery for the music and movie industries.

115. Jason Schultz, File Sharing Must be Made Legal, Salon
(Sept. 12, 2003), http://www.salon.com/2003/09/12/file_sharing_
two/.
116. On the challenges of administering a voluntary licensing
system to end-users, see Meghan Dougherty, Voluntary Collective
Licensing: The Solution to the Music Industry’s Crisis?, 13 J. Intell.
Prop. L., 405, 429 (2006).
117. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47
Harv. Int’l L.J., 353, 355 (2006).
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